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We live in a day of increasing mistrust of government particularly by
the young, the poor, and the black. Much of this mistrust may reflect
no more than dissatisfaction with the failure of government to end the
war, to reduce racial discrimination, or to deal effectively with poverty.
But there is reason to believe that war, racial discrimination, and poverty, important as they obviously are, may only be symptoms of a more
basic difficulty. Where dissatisfaction is deeply felt, the increasingly
common assumption is that constructive change can only come from
confrontation and reallocation of power. Confrontation and crises do
often produce social change and if widespread enough can compel a rethinking of governmental priorities. A reallocation of power can force
changes in the treatment of the young, the black, and the poor. But it
is less clear that crises, confrontation, and power reallocation can prot
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I In the treatment of individuals it has long been apparent that punishment for improper conduct without reward for proper conduct often produces frustration in the
individual rather than positive personality development. Yet, in dealing with some government agencies, such as the police, there has been almost total reliance upon the negativethe exclusionary rule of evidence, civil liability, criminal prosecution-in the apparant
view that this would produce good police work. The Davis book is one of the few constructive proposals for rethinking the ways available to encourage proper governmental
decision-making. For a discussion of the limitations on the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule, see LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making
and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 Micl. L. REv. 987 (1965). The need for a
more adequate response to the control of police practices is made apparant in a series of
studies prepared under the auspices of the American Bar Foundation as part of its
Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice in the United States. See especially L.
TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETECrION OF CRIME (1967), and W. LAFAVE,
AsuRasr (1965). There is a helpful discussion of the need for a more adequate approach
to law enforcement decision-making in TIHE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINIsTRATION OF JUsTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967), and
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duce a workable governmental and social system. It is not necessarily
true that persistent opposition to what is conceived to be bad, important
though that is, will necessarily produce a good system.' The persistent
application of negative sanctions, without also rewarding appropriate
governmental responses, often produces more frustration and increasing
reliance upon force and repression rather than producing constructive
change.2
Much of today's obvious dissatisfaction with government relates to
the way government responds to the concerns of its citizens. This is
reflected in the increasing popularity of proposals for civilian review
boards or an ombudsman, some system of making government more
responsive to the needs and desires of those who lack the power to
make their demands effective through the elective process. Although
courts have served this role to a large degree, there is a limited power
in courts resulting from the fact that only some of the important social
issues of major current concern come before them.
To the extent that dissatisfaction with governmental processes on
the part of the young, the poor, and the black is legitimate, there is
obvious need for change. Change can be achieved in various ways. One
way-the easiest-is to go from crisis to crisis, trying to settle each one
as it arises, making only those changes necessary to resolve the immediate crisis. However, crises are likely to produce constructive change only
when there is a goal or a blueprint setting forth the pattern of change
which is desired. For a time it was generally assumed that those who
complained, who brought about confrontation, had a goal, an alternative system, clearly in mind and were trying to achieve the change necessary to attain that goal. It has become increasingly clear that being
convinced that change is necessary does not necessarily imply that the
person dissatisfied either has an alternative in mind or is really capable
of suggesting what the alternative should be. 3 The development of
better alternatives ought to be the task-the responsibility-of the
2 The frustration resulting from the Johnson Administration's apparent failure to
develop adequate positive approaches to the problems of the young, the poor, and
the black has undoubtedly created pressures on the Nixon Administration to use repressive measures. Thus one of the programs of the new Administration is to call for
the repeal of some Supreme Court decisions. Just as courts have been largely ineffective
in controlling police practices, so also will repeal of court decisions be largely ineffective
in improving police performance or effectiveness. It is Davis' point that we overstress
judicial review; this is illustrated by the federal government's attributing to the present
judicial review of police practices major responsibility for crime and for the ineffectiveness of law enforcement.
3 What has been said to be an objective of anarchy by some young students may instead reflect the fact that they know the reasons for their dissatisfaction but lack the
ability to devise a better system.
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architects of government, those whose interest and commitment are in
orderly governmental processes which command the respect and support
of a broad segment of the community.
Certainly this is a challenge for the lawyer, the professional who has
been looked to as a person skilled in the development of procedures
and systems to structure government's response to the problems of its
citizens. 4 Unfortunately, too often the lawyer, like the citizen generally,
has responded out of emotional commitment, either for or against a
given governmental practice; the police conduct at the national Democratic convention, for example. Or, the response has been traditional,
assuming that the principal path of constructive change is through the
formal process of court litigation; the "test case" approach to change,
for example.5 As a consequence much time has been spent trying either
to determine who was most at fault in a riot situation or in reliance
upon the process of judicial review. Significant as both of these may
be, it has long been apparent that fault-finding inquiries and formal
litigation are not, in themselves, adequate responses to the critical
social and governmental problems of the day. At best they may redress
past wrongs and serve as a stimulus to change. Seldom are they adequate
in themselves both to chart and implement a program of constructive
change.
This is why the contribution of Kenneth Culp Davis is, in my judgment, so significant. He makes an important proposal for reevaluating
the method by which governmental power is exercised today, particularly by agencies most concerned with the important social problems
of the day. His objective is better "discretionary justice" and he has
definite proposals as to how this objective can be achieved. It is obviously too much to expect any proposal to ,be a panacea for the complex
4 Perhaps this is an overstatement. Certainly most lawyers, the academic lawyer particularly, have devoted most of their efforts to being critical of the current system rather
than to devising new and better systems to replace the old. Perhaps this is characteristic
of most higher education and may explain why the young person is better at opposition
than at the development of positive proposals. What makes the Davis book so refreshing

is that he couples criticism of existing practice with a positive proposal for change. Unfortunately this is rare. See e.g., ADvISORY COMMrITEE ON THE PocE IFUNCTION, ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO ELECTRONIC
SuRvEILLANCE (1968), which came out with standards relating to electronic surveillance,

when the great need is for lawyers to direct their attention to the kind of decision-making responsibility which police should have and the kind of system which needs to be
developed to obtain effective and responsible law enforcement.
5 The Davis approach suggests that the reliance upon legal services as a principal
means of social change may be a mistake. See especially p. 182. Valuable though the
efforts of the American Civil Liberties Union- have been in redressing citizen grievances
against police, there is no reason to believe that bringing law suits against police officers
is an effective vehicle for constructive change in law enforcement.
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problems which exist. It is enough that it holds potential for achieving
major improvement.
I
Kenneth Davis, in conversation, describes Discretionary Justice: A
PreliminaryInquiry, as some "three-quarter-thought-out-ideas" in contrast to some "half-thought-out-ideas" expressed in the chapter on
discretionary power in his previously published casebook.6 His selfcharacterization seems unduly modest. Whatever the limitations of the
book, it is apparent, in reading it, that Kenneth Davis has thought more
about how governmental power is exercised today and has more sensible suggestions as to how current practices should be changed than does
anyone else who has expressed his views in writing. This is high praise
and it is intended to be.
Although Kenneth Davis is a distinguished legal scholar, author of a
multi-volume text on administrative law, this latest book of his is noordinary law book. Ordinary administrative law books confine their
attention to prestigious administrative agencies such as the Interstate
Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade Commission, agencies
which have substantial responsibility for the maintenance of economic
order. DiscretionaryJustice deals with these, but it deals also with less
prestigious agencies such as police, prosecutors, and parole boards,
agencies which have substantial responsibility for the maintenance of
the social order.
The background of the author is impressive, and he demonstrates
the wide reach of his interest, his knowledge, and his experience. His
current interest is in the exercise of discretionary power whatever the
nature of the governmental agency, whatever the subject matter with
which it deals. He has a unique ability to view the exercise of discretionary power across a wide spectrum of governmental activity which
results in a book "relevant" to the Federal Trade Commission and to
the police and the correctional, welfare, mental health, and educational
administrators.
Though Professor Davis' interest is in discretionary justice whatever
the governmental agency involved, his ideas are, for me at least, most
stimulating when applied to social regulatory agencies such as the
police; agencies which have been largely neglected by lawyers and
other students of government; and agencies which are, as a consequence,
6 K.C. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, CASES-TExTs-PROBLEMS ch. 4, 70-103 (1965). See
id. at 82-84 where Davis lists 18 ways to control discretion. In doing so he provides a
thought-provoking way of rethinking the way discretion is exercised.
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ill-equipped to respond to the major social crises which confront them
7
today.
The book is written in such an informal, readable, and stimulating
style that the really profound contribution it makes can easily be
overlooked. As is the case with many important contributions to
thought, the central message of the book seems, once read, to be both
obvious and obviously right. It is simply that the exercise of discretionary power by governmental agencies is more important than the
formal process of adjudication and formal rules of law and, as a consequence, the exercise of discretionary power ought to be given much
greater attention than it has in the past to insure that it is properly
confined, structured, and checked.
In his concluding chapter Professor Davis puts the need in this way:
[S]ignificant progress is unlikely if . . . we focus only on the

superior agencies that deal with large economic interests, such
as the federal regulatory agencies and the Internal Revenue
Service, where the quality of justice is usually reasonably high,
and neglect the generally inferior agencies which deal with
mixtures that seem more human than economic, such as
police, prosecutors, welfare agencies, selective service boards,
parole boards, prison administrators, and the Immigration
Service, where the usual quality of justice is relatively low.
Unlike the bar groups, we must dig into the kinds of injustice
that can be neither cured nor alleviated by either formal hearings or judicial review.
The strongest need and the greatest promise for improving
the quality of justice to individual parties in the entire legal
and governmenital system are in the areas where decisions necessarily depend more upon discretion than upon rules and
7 Because I think the "social regulatory" agencies have been neglected, I stress social
issues in this review though I know that Davis intends the book to be one on discretionary justice generally, and he does not emphasize its significance to police, educators, and welfare administrators as much as I do. The apparent fact is that lawyers
have given constructive attention to the economic regulatory agencies, probably because
the economics of the profession made it feasible to do so. The social regulatory agencies
have been neglected, and we are, in my judgment, in the 1960's with regard to regulation of social conduct where we were in the 1930's with regard to the regulation of
economic conduct. Lawyers in the 1930's and since have thought it professionally appropriate to staff economic regulatory agencies. Doesn't the same need exist today with
regard to social regulatory agencies? Former New York Police Commissioner Michael
Murphy once told me that he thought that to head a large city police department requires the abilities and training of a good lawyer. If required for the Federal Trade
Commission, doesn't it follow that Commissioner Murphy is right? Unfortunately the
American Bar Association's Advisory Committee on the Police Function, see note 4 supra,
did not come to grips with this kind of basic and as yet unresolved issue.

1969]

Review

principles and where
formal hearings and judicial review are
8
mostly irrelevant.
The assertion that the study of the exercise of discretionary power
be given highest priority is in a sense obvious, yet it is developed by
Professor Davis in a way which has at least the following significant
implications:
(1) The governmental agency which it is important to study is that
which exercises the greatest amount of discretionary power, rather than
the agency which is the subject of the greatest number of formal rules
of law and most often the subject of formal judicial review.
(2) For every governmental decision there is an optimum point on
the scale between rule-of-law at one end and total discretion at the
other end. The task of research is to find that optimum point and to
confine discretion to the degree which is feasible.
(3) Where discretionary power is exercised, it ought to be confined,
structured, and checked in order to achieve the greatest amount of
discretionary justice and the least amount of discretionary injustice.
Unconfined, unstructured, and unchecked discretion holds great potential for injustice. In deciding how best to confine, structure, and
check discretion, the relatively extensive experience with the economic regulatory agencies is revelant.
Each of these fairly simple, but important, assertions deserves further elaboration.
A. The Importance of Agencies Which Exercise the Broadest Discretionary Power
Even today many lawyers will be surprised to hear an administrative lawyer say:
The police are among the most important policy-makers of
our entire society. And they make far more discretionary determinations in individual cases than any other class of administrators; I know of no close second.9
Despite the fact that this is obviously right, it has only been recently
that there has been any study of the exercise of discretion by police. 10
8 Pp. 215-6 (italics in original).
9 P. 222.

10 The first systematic study of police discretion took place in the American Bar
Foundation's Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice in the United States.
Stimulated in large part by that research, there has been an increasing number of books
and articles dealing with police discretion including the following: M. BANTON, THE
POLICEMAN IN THE COMMUNITY (1964); W. LAFAvE, ARasr 61-161, 490-527 (1965); R. MYREN
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Many assert that it would be better if police merely "enforced the
law fully" and even today there is no police department in the United
States which is equipped to give the kind of consideration an administrative agency should give to the making of important discretionary
decisions. Adequate recognition of the seemingly simple point made
by Kenneth Davis would constitute a much needed first step toward
a fundamental reevaluation of our conception of the police function.
What is said about police can also be said about welfare, mental
health, correctional, and educational administrators, all of whom exercise immense discretionary power which has important effect upon
lives of citizens, particularly the young and the poor who are today
most vocal in their complaints about the lack of sufficient concern
about justice in the exercise of discretion. The failure to give adequate attention to the social regulatory agency reflects a number of
traditional assumptions which seem no longer adequate in the time
of current crisis. For some agencies, welfare and educational, for example, it was assumed that the fact that the administration was motivated by a desire to help the welfare recipient or the student was an
adequate safeguard against injustice. Though it has long been apparent that this was not necessarily so,11 it has taken the current confrontation by the poor and the young to compel reconsideration of this
traditional assumption. For some agencies, correctional, for example,
it was assumed that their decisions involved only "privileges and not
rights," and therefore that ordinary considerations of justice did not
& L. SWANSON, PoLicE WoRK wiTr CHILDREN 27-32 (1962); REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 157-69 (1968); J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT
TRIAL (1966); J.Q. WILSON, VA EIrEFS OF POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF LAw
AND ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES (1968); Abemathy, Police Discretion and Equal Protection, 14 S.C.L.Q. 472 (1962); Bittner, Police Discretion in Emergency Apprehension of
Mentally Ill Persons, 14 Soc. PROB. 278 (1967); Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 427 (1960); H. Goldstein, Administrative Problems in Controlling the Exercise of Police Authority, 58 J. CIm. L.C. & PS. 160 (1967); H. Goldstein,
Police Discretion: The Ideal Versus the Real, 23 PuB. A. REV. 140 (1963); J. Goldstein,
Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the
Administration of Justice, 69 YAE L.J. 543 (1960); Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in
the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904 (1962); LaFave, Improving
Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule (pts. 1-2), 30 Mo. L. REv. 391, 566
(1965); LaFave, The Police and Nonenforcement of the Law (pts. 1-2), 1962 Wis. L. RFV.
104, 179; Osborough, Police Discretion Not to Prosecute Juveniles, 28 MOD. L. REV. 421
(1965); Remington, The Role of Police in a Democratic Society, 56 J. CRum. L.C. & P.S.
361 (1965); Remington & Rosenblum, The Criminal Law and the Legislative Process, 1960
U. ILL. L.F. 481; Comment, Police Discretion and TrayJo Law Enforcement, 39 WAsst.
L. REV. 840 (1964); Note, Police Discretion and the Judgment that a Crime Has Been
Committed-Rape in Philadelphia, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 277 (1968).
11 This point was most effectively made a decade ago in Allen, The Borderline of the
Criminal Law: Problems of "Socializing" Criminal Justice, 32 Soc. SERv. REv. 107 (1958).
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apply.' 2 Professor Davis asks whether a parole decision, unaccompanied
by reasons for the denial of parole, is either good justice or good rehabilitation. The answer seems quite obviously to be no, and no
amount of discussion of the difference between "privilege" and "right"
will change this. For some agencies, police, for example, it has traditionally been assumed that they merely "enforce the law" and thus did
not exercise discretionary power. Even the most casual observation of
police practice demonstrates that this is not so. Rather, as Professor
Davis points out, police probably exercise more discretionary power
than all economic regulatory agencies combined. Finally, as to some
agencies, the prosecutor, for example, it has traditionally been assumed
that it is neither feasible nor desirable to attempt to confine, structure,
or check the wide discretion which he can exercise. Professor Davis
asks why this is so. And there seems no satisfactory answer, aside from
tradition, to his question.
B. The Desirability of Confining Discretion
A couple of decades ago, a leading student of criminal justice administration, Herbert Wechsler, said:
Whatever one would hold as to the need for discretion of this
order in a proper system or the wisdom of attempting regulation of its exercise, it is quite clear that its existence cannot
be accepted as a substitute for a sufficient law. Indeed, one
of the major consequences of the state of penal law today is
that administration has so largely come to dominate the field
without effective guidance from the law. This is to say that to
a large extent we have, in this important sense, abandoned
law-and this within an area where our fundamental teaching calls most strongly for its vigorous supremacy. 13
His subsequent preparation of the Model Penal Code and its influence on state legislation has, to some extent, confined and given greater
guidance to the exercise of discretion in the administration of the
criminal law. But even as ambitious a project as the Model Penal Code
14
can only slightly limit the need to exercise administrative discretion.
12 This issue is helpfully dealt with in F. CoHEN, TnE LEGAAL CHALXNGE TO COPRcONS
(1969).
13

Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1097, 1102 (1952).

14 We have had a fair test of the proposition that revision of the criminal code wil

effectively limit the need to exercise discretion. This assertion was most effectively put
by Joseph Goldstein in Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: LowVisibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960). But neither
the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code nor the major revisions in states such
as Illinois, Minnesota, New York, and Michigan have effectively limited the necessity of
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The Code deals practically not at all with police or prosecutor discretion, and its interesting effort to limit and guide correctional decisionmaking still leaves room for the making of crucially important administrative decisions.
Despite our adherence to the principle that ours is a government
of law not men, it is perfectly apparent, as Davis points out, that ours
is and always must be a government of law and men.15 However, this
does not mean that discretion should not be confined by formal rule
and its exercise subject to legislative or judicial criteria. It does mean
that however ambitious the efforts to confine discretion may be, there
will remain wide opportunity for agencies such as police, welfare,
correctional, and educational agencies to exercise discretion, and it is
important to recognize this fact and to try to find, for each important
governmental decision, the optimum point on the scale between rule
at the one end and unlimited discretion on the other. Too often in the
past it has been assumed that the only choice was between no discretion
(e.g., for police) and unlimited discretion (e.g., for the prosecutor).
C. The Need to Structure and Check Discretion
Where discretion exists, Davis asserts that it should be exercised
openly, except where there are overriding reasons for confidentiality.
Secrecy also holds high potential for injustice. When decisions are
made, reasons should be given for the decision and, whenever possible,
the community should be allowed to react to the decision and the reasons. Justice is best served if people know why they are treated as they
are and what, if anything, they can do to change the treatment they
dislike. This is not only good justice-it is also good education when
students are involved; good treatment when sick people are involved;
and good rehabilitation when social deviants are involved.' 6 There
ought to be opportunity to challenge decisions and have effective review, if not judicial, at least careful administrative review. An administrative agency should strive for consistency. Unexplained disparity of
treatment is unjust. Whenever feasible, individual decisions should be
exercising discretion in administration. Though a persuasive argument can be made that
we should rethink the use of the criminal justice process to deal with behavior such as
drunkenness, narcotics, gambling, and the like, even the removal of these offenses would
still leave the necessity of selective application of the criminal law. And even drunkenness is likely to remain criminal until we develop better alternatives. See Remington,
The Limits and Possibilities of the Criminal Law, 43 NoTRE DAME LAW. 865 (1968).
15 P. 17.
16 Even professional parole board members and highly qualified clinical therapists
differ as to whether an inmate should be told why he is denied parole. However, among

younger clinical personnel there is a tendency to favor a maximum

interest of both fairness and good therapy.

of disclosure in the
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guided by general administrative policies formulated by the agency on
the basis of its decision-making experience.17 The best way to accomplish all of these things is to use the administrative rule-making process
whenever possible, which Davis looks upon as one of the great inventions of government' but one too little used, particularly by police,
educators, and welfare, mental health, and correctional administrators.
II
How significant are the Davis proposals? One test is in the effect
they will have, if followed, upon the handling of current, difficult social situations to which government is called upon to respond. For most
government agencies, mayors, police, and educators, the current student disorders present a most perplexing challenge and thus present a
good test.
For example, there was in early May 1969 in Madison, Wisconsin a
series of very serious student disorders. The precipitating factor was
the refusal to allow a large group of students to have a street dance in
the 500 block of West Mifflin Street. It is important to understand
some of the background events which led up to the West Mifflin Street
disorders.
In 1961, the Chief of Police explained that he had instructed his officers to enforce the curfew ordinance only when there was reason to
believe that the young person did not have some legitimate reason for
being on the street after the curfew hour. This public statement of the
Chief produced the following editorial comment in the local newspaper
with a liberal reputation:
A strange philosophy of law enforcement has been expounded by Madison Police Chief Wilbur H. Emery. The
17 A proposal favoring police policy-making is found in THE PRESIDENT'S ConMSSION

JusTicE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE
ch. 2, 13-41 (1967); it is also recommended in the Kerner Commission Report, see REPoRT
OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DIsORDERS 164-5 (1968). The suggestion
is also contained, as Davis points out, in the ALI MODEL CODE OF PREARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 1.03 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966). See p. 92. The issue of policy-making in criminal
justice administration at both the police and correctional stages is dealt with in some
detail in F. REMINGTON, D. NEWMAN, E. KIMBALL, M. MELLI & H. GOLDSTEIN, CRIMINAL
JUsTIcE ADMINISMRATION pt. IV, ch. 18, 1171-1214 (1969). See also the helpful discussion in
Ruth, Promoting Consistent Policy in the Criminal Justice Process, 53 VA. L. REv. 1489
(1967). There is indication that police and correctional administrators are becoming more
sensitive to the need for giving more attention to the development of more adequate departmental policies to guide and control important law enforcement decisions. It is not
unlikely that this will be more common in the future if, but only if, there is increasing
recognition of the important public policy-making function which police agencies do and
must inevitably perform.
18 P. 92.
ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
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Chief says his officers cannot enforce the letter of the law setting a curfew of 10 p.m. on city streets for children under 17
who are not accompanied by a parent.
Chief Emery says he does not think the public would stand
for strict enforcement of the letter of the law. The courts,
too, he feels, would take a dim view of overly strict enforcement.
Since when, we feel compelled to inquire, is it the function
of the police chief to decide which laws can or cannot be
enforced? By what authority does he claim the right to interpret what the "public" will or will not stand for in law enforcement?
In a representative government the will of the people is
expressed through their elected public bodies. The curfew law
is an official city ordinance, duly passed by the city council,
and as such is open to no other interpretation but that it is
the will of the people. The essence of our system of government is that we are governed by law, not by whim or decree.
It is the function of the police to enforce these laws. If the
law needs revision or repeal that is for the people to decide
through the city council. Meantime, the Chief is legally and
morally obliged to carry out the letter of the law.
This, we repeat, is a strange philosophy of law enforcement. If the curfew law may be violated with impunity why
should not other citizens violate other laws which they might
find irksome? This is the road to anarchy. 19
Some time later the city council passed an additional ordinance
prohibiting persons from being in public parks after 10:00 p.m. It
was apparent that he ordinance was prompted by concern over rising vandalism in the parks at night. When the Chief of Police inquired
as to whether he should enforce the law literally, he was told by
council members that he should use "common sense."
During the fall of 1967, a disturbance occurred on the Wisconsin
campus growing out of efforts by students to block recruiting by the
Dow Chemical Company. Madison police were criticized by much of
the university community for their use of force in removing demonstrators instead of using alternative methods of dealing with the "sit-in."
In the period between 1967 and the spring of 1969 there was an
acceleration of public interest in police (paralleling national attention
given the police). On the one hand, the state legislature had under
19 The Capital Times, Sept. 9, 1961. This editorial is used as -part of the material dealing with "The Decision Whether to Enforce the Law" in F. REMINGTON, D. NEWmvAN, E.
KIMBALL, M. MELLI & H. GOLDSTEIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 276-326 (1969).
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active consideration a bill which would place responsibility for policing the Madison campus on the Madison City Police Department
(rather than the campus police) because the Madison city police would
presumably "enforce the law." Student government was at the same
time supporting the Madison firemen's claim of the right to pay-parity
with police, a position which obviously depreciates the social policy
responsibility which the police have. Both sides-legislature and student-in effect, took the position that the police role was largely
ministerial, not one involving a broad responsibility for exercising discretionary power.
Late in April, 1969, there was a large-scale demonstration at the
State Capitol led by the controversial Father James Groppi of Milwaukee. A large number of black, Spanish-speaking, and white persons
from Milwaukee came, in caravan style, to the State Capitol to protest
the cut in funds by the legislature for assistance to the poor in Milwaukee. When the caravan arrived in Madison, most of the vehicles
were double parked around the Capitol square in violation of city
ordinance. The Chief of Police ordered a moratorium in the giving of
parking tickets and concentrated the police efforts on the protection
of persons and property. For this, he came under substantial criticism
which he responded to, in an appearance before the city council, by
saying that it was his responsibility to exercise discretion and he did
so by deciding that the protection of persons and property was of
greater importance than the enforcement of the double parking ordinance. After a debate during which one motion would have had the
Chief enforce the law 100 per cent of the time, the city council finally commended the Chief for the handling of the matter. However,
most critical public discussion proceeded on the assumption that if
there is a law it should be enforced. Those who spoke in support of
the Chief reflected more sympathy for the Father Groppi group than
they did for the open exercise of discretion by the Chief and the willingness on his part to explain publicly what his decision was and his
reasons for making it.
About a week later, there was a street dance on Gilman Street which
the police officers present on the scene did nothing to prevent, but
rather blocked off the street and redirected traffic. After the dance
the students complimented the police for allowing the dance to be
held.
Some weeks later a group, largely students, decided to hold a dance
on West Mifflin Street. The police attempted to prevent the street
from being blocked off. The police intervention was met by resistance
and, in consequence, a serious three-day riot was precipitated.
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The effort of police to prevent the holding of the dance was explained on the basis that such use of the street was prohibited by
city ordinance. Adherence to the conception that ours is a government
of law, not men, lends respectability to this kind of explanation. It
has not since been made clear whether a decision was made at all and,
if so, whether it was made by the police inspector on the scene, the
Chief, or the Mayor. Of course, strict adherence to the "government
of law" objective would lead to the conclusion that the decision was
made by the city council when the ordinance was passed leaving no
room for the exercise of administrative discretion. The earlier decision
to allow the street dance on Gilman Street was subsequently explained
in a traditionally acceptable way on the ground that there was insufficient police manpower then available to handle the situation.
Although there is no way of identifying precisely what caused the
widespread disorder on West Mifflin Street, there are some likely explanations. There is a segment of the student body which deliberately
creates disorder as a political device for achieving change. But, for the
vast majority of students, the explanation of their frustration may well
lie in the way the decision was made. They knew of the prior street
dance on Gilman Street, and the explanation of lack of manpower as a
reason for allowing it was not convincing. What is more important,
students were aware that streets had-in higher income areas-been
blocked off for all kinds of purposes such as soap box derbies, sledding
in winter, and even block parties.
Following the disorder, the general consensus of the university
community has been that it is important to determine whose fault the
disorder was. The Mayor has appointed a committee to make a factfinding inquiry.
But it seems apparent that the finding of fault will serve no objective
other than to reinforce the views of one opposing side or another.
Instead of concern for fixing blame, the need is to make changes in
the way government responds to issues such as whether a block party
can be held on Mifflin Street in order to minimize, insofar as it is possible to do so, the risk that disorder will be relied upon as the way to
resolve the issue. In my view, the approach which Kenneth Davis
suggests is the most constructive which has as yet been advanced. It
would recognize the situation as it exists (i.e., police do make important policy decisions, do so in situations where it is unclear whether
the statute or ordinance contemplates that police discretion is properly
to be exercised, and many important decisions are left to subordinates
who are little supervised by superiors). Changes are necessary to better
confine, structure, and check police discretion (i.e., by revising statutes
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and ordinances to better confine discretion, afford criteria to guide its
exercise when policy-making responsibility is left to police, require
police to make policy through rule-making procedures whenever feasible, with less delegation to subordinates and with as much public
participation as is possible).
Applied to the Mifflin Street situation, the Davis suggestion could
result in important changes. If the conclusion is reached that presently
police are called upon to exercise too much discretion, there would
then be need to give more careful legislative attention to the drafting
of statutes or ordinances than is now the case. Where narrowly drawn
legislation is not feasible, it may be desirable to provide legislative
criteria to guide the enforcement of the particular ordinance or statute
or criteria to guide the exercise of discretion generally. For example,
it may be desirable to provide legislatively that the primary responsibility of police is to maintain public order and to provide further the
authority to refrain from enforcing a statute or ordinance when in the
judgment of the law enforcement administrator enforcement would
create an undue risk of public disorder.
Where the responsibility for exercising discretion is left to police,
the need to make a law enforcement decision would be explicitly recognized, the decision should be made openly, reasons given, public debate encouraged, perhaps there should be review by the mayor and
city council, and either reaffirmation or change in the policy decided
upon by the law enforcement agency.20 The statement of the Madison
20 For a similar suggestion applied to juvenile proceedings, see Remington, Due Process
in Juvenile Proceedings, 11 WAYNE L. REv. 688, 693-4 (1965):
In my opinion, police, social workers, prosecutors and judges do have an obligation to fashion a sensible adult or juvenile enforcement policy within the limits
prescribed by the legislature. This is not only necessary, it is clearly expected by
the legislature. One confronted with a difficult drafting problem often resolves it
by overgeneralization and the statement that "common sense" will be used in
administration. In my view "common sense" in this situation is an essential of
"due process."
To achieve what I advocate, juvenile justice agencies should try to do the
following:
1. Formulate policies at the arrest, detention, referral, adjudication and disposition stages that are, insofar as possible, known to the community and subject to community discussion. Rather than criticize, I would commend the
Madison police chief for announcing publicly his curfew policy. If it appears that
existing policies, as to what will be considered delinquent conduct, lack public

support, perhaps they should be changed by the agency or by legislation or a
change in public attitude ought to be sought by an educational campaign.
Juvenile justice agencies ought to resist the temptation to use ambiguity as a
method of avoiding controversy over important policy decisions.
2. The effectiveness of the policies should be constantly reevaluated to insure
that they are consistent with the general purposes of the legislation. If some
persons falling within the broad definition of delinquency are placed in detention
while others are released, there is an obligation to those detained to insure that
their basis of selection is a sensible one and in fact related to the objective of
the program. Agency research of this kind is not only desirable but an essential
of "due process."
3. The policies should be consistently applied without regard to factors not
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Police Chief with respect to the curfew and with respect to the Father
Groppi demonstration should be applauded rather than condemned
as a violation of a basic principle of American government. Responsible
student concern for police performance should recognize the important
social responsibility which police are called upon to exercise and use
efforts to improve the ability and responsibility of police rather than
to attempt to hold police to pay-parity with firemen. On the Davis
scale measuring the need to exercise discretionary power, the police
would rank very high, the firemen very low.
III
Although this makes good sense, there are a number of philosophical
and practical problems which are likely to cause many to hesitate to
recognize that the exercise of discretionary power by police is inevitable and even desirable if properly confined, structured, and checked.
(1) There is a surprisingly strong commitment to the preeminence
of the rule of law, that rule not discretion should control the decisions
which are made. Even Davis speaks longingly of the day when legislative revisions of the substantive criminal law will drastically reduce
the necessity for the exercise of discretion by the police and characterizes Chicago Police Superintendent 0. W. Wilson's nonenforcement
of the jaywalking ordinances as "police illegality." 21 One would have
thought that Davis, more than others, would accept the inevitability
and, in some situations, even desirability of broad legislative standards,
leaving to the enforcement agency not only the power but the responsibility to exercise discretion and to do so whenever possible through
the utilization of an administrative rule-making procedure. And one
would have thought that Davis would look upon the enactment of a
jaywalking ordinance as authority to arrest persons who cross in the
middle of the street when the circumstances indicate that to make arrests would significantly contribute to traffic safety and where the utilization of police resources for that purpose would accomplish a greater
public good than utilizing those resources for other purposes. The assumption, shared by Davis, is that the legislative mandate to police is
"to enforce the law" when it is at least arguable that the primary objective today ought to be the maintenance of community order, and
relevant to the basic objectives of the policies. Flexibility is not grounds for indiscriminate differentiation in the handling of individuals.
4. The juvenile involved ought to be made aware of the policy applicable
to him and the reasons for it. The full achievement of "due process" requires a
system which is not only in fact fair but one which, to the extent possible, impresses the juvenile as being fair.
21 p. 86.
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"the law" ought not to be enforced when to do so may actually pro22
duce more disorder and thus sacrifice a greater community value.
Certainly in Madison the riot was a greater loss than the value achieved
by the prevention of the dance. But even Professor Davis has difficulty
in concluding that police ought to have so broad an authority and
would, if I understand him, move the criminal law as far along the
scale to the rule end and as far away from the discretion end as is possible.23 This may arguably be desirable. If so, strenuous efforts should
22

Davis does cite a Chicago ordinance which states that it is the "duty of the traffic

bureau ...

to make arrests for traffic violations" (p. 85) and concludes from this that

the legislative purpose was full enforcement of the law. Pp. 87-88. This was a position
ably presented some years ago by Joseph Goldstein in Police Discretion Not to Invoke the
Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J.
543 (1960). See note 14 supra. The difficulty with the position is that it is unreal. There
is overwhelming evidence that legislative bodies do not expect or desire full enforcement.
Professor Davis also uses social gambling as an example citing the failure of the Chicago
police fully to enforce the law as an illustration of "the flagrance of the illegality." P. 84.
Legislative history in most states is conclusive that overgeneralization of the gambling
statutes is not a mandate to full enforcement but a delegation of discretion to use
selective enforcement against commercial gambling with a broad statute designed to prevent the commercial gambler from finding "loopholes." See Remington & Rosenblum, The
Criminal Law and the Legislative Process, 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 481. Why is it flagrant police
"illegality" to do what the legislature expects and desires? The inference is that police
are at fault. If the point is that legislatures should narrow the scope of the gambling
statute (p. 93: "The best solution would be for the legislative body to answer all the major
questions with clarity and precision ... . ), the experience is that this has been carefully
considered and rejected by legislatures. Is the consequence of that legislative judgment,
"police illegality"? Or does the "illegality" follow from a failure of police to follow Davis'
second choice (p. 93: ". . failing that, the next best solution is for the police through
rule-making procedure to give systematic and dear answers to all the major questions
:.. I hope I have made dear that my quarrel is not with Professor Davis' objective
.").
of more adequate police, policy-making procedures. Quite the contrary. See especially
THE PaREmSrDN'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADmiNISTRATION OF JuSTiCE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: TnE PoLicE ch. 2, 13-41 (1967) (written by Herman Goldstein and myself, see Katzenbach, Forward to id. at iv). My quarrel is as to whether expecting the
legislative bodies "to answer all the major questions with clarity and precision" is realistic
or necessarily desirable in situations such as gambling. Why is legislative resolution of
higher priority than administrative resolution through proper rule-making procedures?
Even if legislative precision is of highest priority, how does legislative failure result in
police illegality when police engage in the kind of selective enforcement desired by the
legislative body? I think it ridiculous to say, "But when Chicago police arrested a group
of prominent citizens who were playing a friendly game of poker, the superintendent of
police announced on the front pages that he was sorry; his policy, he said, was not to
arrest for gambling in absence of a commercial element. What the Illinois legislature had
enacted was partly nullified by the police chief. The law for Chicago is not what the
legislature enacts; it is what the police chief says to the newspapers." Pp. 84-85. This was
used to illustrate "the flagrance of the [police] illegality." P. 84. My point (to repeat for
emphasis) is that 0. W. Wilson should be complimented for his openness, not cited as an
illustration of police illegality. Indeed I would hope the Chicago police would make the
Wilson statement a formal policy of the department, using the rule-making procedure
suggested by Professor Davis.
23 I recognize that Professor Davis' basic point is that there is an optimum point for
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be made to revise and limit not only federal and state criminal laws,
but also a wide variety of local ordinances, most of which are drafted
in terms too broad to be applied literally in an unthinking manner.
But years of experience, including major efforts at legislative revision,
indicate clearly that even if desirable this kind of legislative preciseness is not feasible. And, even in theory, it seems probable that a
greater protection against arbitrariness will result if the generality of
legislation is recognized as inevitable; there is effort to incorporate
legislative criteria, such as those suggested in the correctional provision
of the Model Penal Code; and, most importantly, the enforcement
agency is mandated to make enforcement decisions openly, giving reasons and utilizing, whenever possible, the administrative rule-making
process. One would have thought this would be the preference of Davis
and I do not believe he would greatly resist it, but so strong is the
traditional mistrust of police, so tempting is it to view police conduct in black and white terms, either legal or illegal, that the aspiration for a rule-dominated system continues. The danger is compromise:
the achievement of neither the values of rule nor of discretion; the
maintenance of the illusion of a rule-dominated system, ignored in
practice by the exercise of discretion, commonly by the least qualified
officer on the beat. The consequence of this is more rather than less
discretion, less rather than more openness, and less rather than more
structuring and control of the discretion which is exercised.
(2) The refusal to recognize the inevitability and desirability of the
exercise of discretion by police may perhaps be thought to be itself
a form of control over the abuse of police power. Since most police
conduct which involves nonenforcement of the law (e.g., failure to
enforce fully the jaywalking ordinance) can be called-as Davis calls it
-illegal, it is not difficult to place the label of illegality upon any
police conduct thought by any group to be unwise. Thus there is always available the claim that what police did (i.e., in not enforcing
the double parking ordinance) is illegal and thus wrong. This is an
easier argument to sustain than it is to grant the propriety of exercising
discretion but to argue the impropriety of the particular decision (e.g.,
that it was unwise to give priority to protection of persons and places
during the Father Groppi demonstration rather than enforce the double parking ordinance).
(8) Recognition of the fact that agencies such as police do make
each decision on the rule-to-discretion scale. With this I agree. Perhaps I read too much
into his statement at 93: "The best solution would be for the legislative body to answer
all the major questions with clarity and precision ....
" Compare Remington & Rosenblum, The Criminal Law and the Legislative Process, 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 481, 481 n.2.
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important decisions affecting important community values and the
insistence that these be made openly and reasons given, would result
in there having to be some painful reappraisal by the community and
its elected representatives. Thus most of the academic community
would support a resolution condemning police use of improper methods of dealing with student disorders. Those same persons, however,
might find it much more difficult to conclude that consistency and
adherence to principle require the same condemnation of the use of
unlawful enforcement methods to make the streets safe around a university located in a high crime area of a large city.2 4 The difficulty with
the latter is that it puts a hard choice-illegality or suspicious persons
left on the street under circumstances which strike fear in the minds
of the law-abiding. Other alternatives are difficult and costly so that
the temptation is to tolerate, without admitting support for, police
"lawlessness." Put another way, requiring police to be open and consistent in the decisions they make would require the community also
to be consistent or openly admit support for illegality. This is a tough
issue, difficult and expensive to resolve.
(4) Recognition of the importance and desirability of the exercise
of discretion by police would almost inevitably lead to a radical rethinking of the nature of the police function. Equating police and firemen's pay scales would become obviously inappropriate. It would become clear that the police administrator's job is more important and
more difficult than that of the prosecutor, judge, or probation or parole
agent, and one would have to ask why the latter requires six or seven
years of university education while the police administrator is commonly a high school graduate. It would also be apparent that the police
task is more difficult and complicated than is the task of the economic
regulatory agency, and one would have to ask why the one is staffed
with lawyers and others apparently skilled in making policy decisions
and the police agency not so staffed. Recognizing police as important
government administrators would be very expensive, and the temptation is strong, perhaps inevitable, to search for simple solutions to the
problems of social disorder: better equipment; psychological testing
of police applicants; a few more hours of training; a few college credits;
a civilian review board; the prosecution and conviction of a few errant
policemen, usually of low rank; public condemnation of police brutality; and other simple and inexpensive but unfortunately ineffective
24 For example, a high-ranking administrator in the Chicago Police Department has
said that the greatest pressure to use whatever methods are necessary to clear the area
of suspicious and otherwise undesirable persons came from the University of Chicago
community.
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ways of approaching perhaps the most important issue facing this nation today-the development of a system for achieving social order
by means which command widespread community respect and support.
IV
The achievement of a high level of discretionary justice is essential
if government is to maintain social and economic stability by means
which command the respect and support of the vast majority of its
citizens. Some things are clear.
Concentration on courts and judicial processes to achieve justice
cannot be sufficient, and the proper current interest in legal services
and the test case as a means of social reform ought not to obscure that
fact. Courts have relatively little impact upon the amount of discretionary justice or injustice.
The need is to give more careful and constructive attention to the
practices of government agencies, particularly the social regulatory
agencies which have been so badly neglected in the past, especially by
lawyers. In doing so there should be a reevaluation of the decisionmaking process to insure that there is an optimum balance for that
decision on the rule-to-discretion scale and where discretion is to be
properly exercised, careful attention to insure that the decision is made
openly, with reasons given, criteria consistently applied, and, when
possible, rule-making procedures utilized.
This kind of honest, constructive, and, for the governmental agency,
painful reevaluation of the decision-making process is what Kenneth
Culp Davis proposes. Its popularity will be limited by the fact that
it is bound to be difficult and expensive. But, taken seriously, the
Davis proposal would result in basic changes in social regulatory agencies, particularly the police, and change is badly needed.

